Commentary: More to Middle East Conflict Than Some Indonesians Assume
More than five years after the beginning of the uprising in Tunisia that toppled dictator Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, the Arab Spring has turned into an Arab Winter. Besides Tunisia, which overall has been quite successful in its democratic experiment, other Arab nations have ended up either with an authoritarian regime back in power or are descending into the chaos of civil war, with extremists making gains in Syria, Iraq and Libya under the banner of Islamic State.
Indonesians are watching the developments in the Middle East with much interest. Due to the religious-based emotional attachment, Indonesia is often trying to get involved in the Middle East, not as a participant, but as a mediator: trying to bring peace to the region.
At the same time, the ordinary Indonesians’ view of this region in general is simplistic. The knee-jerk reaction to bad news coming from the Middle East usually involves either blaming the United States and Israel — although indeed in some cases this is not entirely without reason — or even Zionist conspiracies.
The US invasion in 2003, for example, could be blamed for the current mess in Iraq, though that does not absolve Iraqi politicians from their mistakes: constant squabbling and overt discrimination toward the minority Sunnis. A similar thing happened in Libya, where the vacuum of power after the overthrow of long-time dictator Muammar el-Qaddafi led to a complete breakdown in state authority, which in turn led to the rise of warlordism. The Israelis can also be blamed for their policies toward the Palestinians, notably the expansion of settlements, which is not helping the peace process at all.
It is simply too simplistic and naive, however, to blame every single bad thing that is happening in the Middle East on a Zionist conspiracy, or US foreign policy. There are many different, often unique, reasons for each country’s problems. To paraphrase Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, every problematic country is problematic in its own way.
If we do have to generalize, though, when Middle Eastern countries get into trouble, this is often caused by two mundane but closely related facts: governments are not trusted by their people and at the same time these governments are not strong enough to impose their will on the entire country. Also, the problems are exacerbated by the geopolitical developments in the region, notably the struggle for power between Shiite powerhouse Iran and its Sunni-majority counterpart, Saudi Arabia.
The Saudis see themselves as facing an existential struggle against Iran. Saudi Arabia is surrounded by countries that seem to be closely influenced by Tehran, which send troops and weapons to help these countries deal with insurgencies. The current government in Iraq, for instance, is openly welcoming Iranian assistance in order to defeat Islamic State militants, who are controlling a huge part of the country. The Syrian government under President Bashar al-Assad has only been able to stay in power thanks to the help from the Iranian-backed Hezbollah movement. Hezbollah also has a very strong influence in Lebanon.
Therefore, the Saudis reacted strongly to the pro-democracy protest in Bahrain by militarily intervening in the country, fearing that the protest was covertly backed by Iran because the majority of the protesters were Shiites. Similarly, in Yemen, when Houthi fighters, in response to twin suicide bombing of Shiite mosques (which killed more than 140 people) decided to invade Aden, the last remaining stronghold of the Yemen government, the Saudis reacted by bombing Houthi positions. The Saudis were supported by a coalition of other Arab states. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal stressed that the kingdom would take all the necessary steps to deal with the political crisis in Yemen.
Moreover, in order to prevent the further expansion of Iranian power in the Gulf and beyond, Saudi Arabia has also started to export its anti-Shiite policy, as recently noted by Patrick Cockburn in "The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution."
Iran itself has been constantly challenging Saudi leadership in the Middle East and trying to maintain its influence. On a couple of occasions, Iran has expressed its desire to reclaim the past glory of the Fatimid caliphate (909-1171) and the Safavid dynasty (1501-1736). During these periods, the Shiites controlled the entire Arabian Peninsula. In 2014, for instance, Iranian lawmaker Ali Ridha Zakani boasted that Iran already controlled three Arab capitals (Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad), with Yemen's capital Sanaa being next in line to “join the Iranian Revolution.”
The struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia has given the regional power struggle a sectarian flavor, leading many people to see this as purely a clash between the Shiites and the Sunnis, even though religious fervor is often conveniently sidestepped whenever it doesn't help rulers achieve political goals.
For instance, back in the 1960s, Saudi Arabia collaborated intensively with Iran in order to contain what they both perceived as Egypt’s expansionist policy under Gamal Abdel Nasser, especially when he got involved in Yemen's civil war in 1962. And in contrast to the military intervention in Bahrain and Yemen, the Saudis did nothing — apart from the usual rhetorical condemnations — when conflict erupted between Israel and Hamas, simply because Saudi Arabia no longer sees Israel as a threat (but merely as another status-quo power that would not do much to challenge its position, unlike Iran). Of course, the fact that Hamas was funded by Iran also factored in Saudi’s calculation.
While conflict in the Middle East has often been framed and perceived in Indonesia as religious war — between Judaism and Islam or between Sunnis and Shiites — the reality is often much more mundane. What is happening is first and foremost a struggle for power between the states of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Yet that reality is often overlooked and many Indonesians naively support one side over the other, simply because of a sense of religious solidarity. Shiites here, as a consequence, have been discriminated against by influential members of the Sunni majority, such as former religious affairs minister Suryadharma Ali, who has reportedly stated that Shiites should all convert to the proper Sunni understanding of Islam.
The Indonesian government should solve this problem of a hardening sectarian divide. It can do so by stressing the importance and benefits of diversity and by acting forcefully to prevent or deal with any violence committed in the name of religion. The government also needs to strengthen tolerant attitudes with the help of civil society groups and schools. Besides the government, Islamic mass organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which represent the moderate majority of Indonesian Muslims, should be called upon to tackle the spread of radical movements such as IS. And the government must be willing to uphold the Indonesian constitution by canceling every local government initiative that discriminates against minorities.
Asrudin Azwar is an international relations analyst from the Asrudian Center. Yohanes Sulaiman is a lecturer in international politics at the National Defense University (Unhan).
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